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1.  Introduction 
For the past twenty years, the horizontal and vertical models have dominated the research on 
foreign direct investment (FDI).  In the horizontal model, which was originally formulated by Markusen 
(1984), a multinational enterprise produces in multiple countries to minimize the costs associated with trade 
and the creation of firm-specific assets.  In the vertical model, developed by Helpman (1984), FDI occurs to 
take advantage of factor price differences between countries.  Recent work by Markusen, Venables, Konan, 
and Zhang (MVKZ, 1996) and Markusen (1997) has combined these two motivations for FDI into a unified 
approach called the Knowledge Capital (KK) model.  According to Markusen and Maskus (1999) among 
others, one of the key methods for distinguishing between the horizontal and vertical motivations for FDI is 
to analyze the relationship between countries’ relative factor endowments and FDI.  In particular, the 
literature has focused on countries’ relative supplies of skilled labor.1  According to the theory, horizontal 
FDI is greatest when countries have similar endowments since this supports production of the MNE’s good 
in both countries.  Vertical investment, however, is greatest when countries have very different endowments 
since that creates large differences in factor prices.  When these are combined in the KK model, Carr, 
Markusen, and Maskus (CMM, 2001) indicate that total FDI (horizontal and vertical combined) is increasing 
in the skill difference, defined as the parent’s relative endowment of skilled labor minus the host’s relative 
endowment of skilled labor.   
CMM confirm this pattern using data on in- and outbound U.S. FDI.  Blonigen, Davies, and 
Head (BDH, 2002), however, use the CMM empirical specification and data but allow for different signs on 
either side of equal relative endowments, that is, on either side of zero skill differences.  In contrast to the 
CMM results, they find that FDI is not always positively related to the skill difference as posited by CMM.  
In particular, while they do find the predicted positive relationship when the host is skill abundant, when the 
parent is skill abundant, they find that FDI decreases in the skill difference, not increases.  They find the 
same pattern in both an expanded U.S. sample and in OECD data.  This negative relationship is confirmed in 
the empirical analysis of Markusen and Maskus (1999) and Markusen and Maskus (2001).  Because of their 
results, BDH and Markusen and Maskus (1999) indicate that the horizontal model cannot be rejected in favor 
                                                 
1 See for example, Markusen and Venables (2000) who couch the horizontal model in these terms. 
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of the KK model.  Overall, as Braconier, Norb@ck, and Urban (2002) discuss, there is very little existing 
evidence for vertical FDI even in the so-called “gravity” tests of FDI.  Are we then to take the combined 
empirical work to mean that the KK model is wrong?  Certainly not, since the KK model nests the horizontal 
motivation for FDI.  Why then should we use the KK model, which is far more complex than the horizontal 
model?  The answer to this is that the KK model also allows for vertical FDI.  However, if there is no 
evidence of vertical FDI in the data, why should we bother?  Alternatively, why are we not finding evidence 
for vertical FDI? 
This paper addresses this final question.  I propose that the reason we have not yet found vertical 
FDI in the empirical work on the KK model is that researchers are not using an empirical specification that 
gives vertical FDI a chance to show itself.  In developing the CMM (2001) empirical framework, they rely 
on simulations that indicate that, all else equal, FDI should be strictly increasing in the skill difference.  This 
presupposes, however, that increasing vertical FDI more than compensates for any decline in horizontal FDI.  
While this is certainly possible, the results of Markusen and Maskus (1999) and BDH (2002) show that it is 
not in fact true.  I therefore propose a more general specification of the KK model that allows for non-
monotonicities on both sides of zero skill differences.  In my results I find that when the parent is skill 
abundant, but only slightly so, FDI is decreasing in the skill difference.  This is consistent with horizontal 
FDI dominating in this region.  As the skill difference rises, this relationship reverses itself and FDI is 
increasing in the skill difference.  This is consistent vertical FDI dominating investment when the parent is 
very skill abundant.  I find the same patterns using CMM’s (2001) U.S. data as well as BDH’s (2002) 
expanded U.S. and OECD data.  Thus, by using a more general empirical specification, I am able to control 
for the switching between horizontal and vertical investment in my estimation, which was a primary goal of 
the KK model in the first place.  As a result, unlike earlier authors, I am able to reject the horizontal model of 
FDI in favor of the KK model even when using their same data sets.  This result is strongest when using the 
stock of FDI as the measure of FDI activity (as was done in the BDH OECD data) and when using this 
measure, I can construct a list of parent and host countries for vertically dominated FDI. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows.  In Section 2, I briefly discuss the three models of FDI 
and how they relate to skill differences.  This section also contains a discussion of the existing estimates of 
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the KK model and why they may be too restrictive with respect to the emergence of vertical FDI.  Section 3 
describes my alternative empirical specification and my data.  Section 4 presents my estimates as well as a 
list of the countries for which FDI is vertically dominated.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  The Theory and Evidence on FDI 
 In this section I briefly review the motivations for the horizontal and vertical models of FDI 
and how they combine with one another in the KK model.  In particular, I focus on the role of skill or 
relative factor endowment differences since, as noted by Markusen and Maskus (1999) this provides the best 
way to distinguish between the models.  My discussion is intentionally non-technical.  I choose this approach 
because the models themselves are extremely complex and a full treatment of them requires an entire book 
(such as Markusen, 2002).  Instead, by focusing on the overall ideas behind the various models and using 
these as guiding principles, I hope make it as clear as possible why the current empirical specifications may 
be too restrictive for finding vertical FDI and why my chosen alternative side improves upon the existing 
work.  I conclude this section with a review of the relevant empirical literature. 
 Before discussing each of the models in particular, let me set up a framework for their unified 
treatment.  Consider a two country, two good, two factor world.  Label the two countries home and foreign.  
Note that this is a different label than parent and host, which refer to the citizenship of a particular MNE.  
The two factors are skilled and unskilled labor.  One good, which can be produced by MNEs, has a two-stage 
production process.  In the first stage, the MNE must undertake some headquartering activity.  This is 
intended to represent the development of blueprints, technologies, and the like.  The second stage is the 
actual physical production of the good.  The headquartering and production stages can be geographically 
separated.  A MNE’s parent country is given by the location of its headquartering activity.  In a horizontal 
MNE, production takes place in both countries while headquartering takes place in only the parent country.  
In a vertical MNE, production occurs only in the host while headquartering is again done only in the parent.  
A national firm does both activities in the same country.  In addition to this sector, there is a second, 
numeraire sector.  Factor intensities are such that headquartering is the most skill intensive activity while 
production of the numeraire is the least skill intensive.   
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2.1 The Horizontal Model 
 The first presentation of the horizontal model is Markusen (1984).  In its original version, the 
two countries are identical and Markusen compares the equilibria with one MNE to that with two national 
firms.  In the horizontal model, a MNE firm has two advantages over a national firm.  The first advantage 
arises because headquartering is a joint input, that is, it can be used in multiple production locations, 
including those in other countries, without additional cost.  Thus, if two national firms were producing the 
same amount as the single horizontal MNE, their average headquartering costs would be twice as great.  The 
second advantage of the MNE is that by servicing a market through local production, it avoids trade costs.2  
In determining the relationship between the skill difference and horizontal FDI, the key is to recall that the 
skill-intensive production of the MNE’s good takes place in both countries.  As one country becomes skill 
abundant relative to the other, it gains a comparative advantage in both headquartering and the production of 
the MNE’s good.  Thus, the MNE has an incentive to shift production and citizenship towards the skill 
abundant country.  Therefore, as the skill differences rises, FDI goes down since the MNE produces less in 
the host.   
More recent versions of the horizontal model, such as Markusen and Venables (1998) and 
Markusen and Venables (2000), treat the MNE sector as one with differentiated products and multiple 
MNEs.  These models are particularly useful because bilateral FDI flows arise in equilibrium and therefore 
come closer to observed patterns of investment.  To determine the effect of relative skill endowments on FDI 
in these models, again begin with identical countries and zero skill differences.  Now let the home country 
become slightly more skill abundant relative to the foreign country.  This corresponds to a rise in the skill 
difference for MNEs from home (a positive skill difference for home’s outbound FDI) and a drop in the skill 
difference for MNEs from foreign (a negative skill difference for foreign’s outbound FDI).  Just as in the 
simpler version of the model, home’s outbound FDI drops because the foreign country becomes a less 
attractive location for production of its MNEs’ products.  Thus, for skill differences above zero, there is a 
negative relationship between the skill difference and horizontal FDI.  In the foreign country, this shift in 
                                                 
2 In fact, in its original version, the horizontal firm structure only strictly dominates a national monopolist under 
positive trade costs. 
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relative endowments means that it is no longer as attractive a location for either the production of the MNE’s 
good or the headquartering activity.  Because of this drop in foreign’s headquartering activity, foreign’s 
outbound FDI also drops.  Thus, as the difference between foreign’s relative skill endowment and home’s 
relative skill endowment becomes negative, foreign’s outbound FDI decreases.  Turning this around, as the 
skill difference rises, i.e. it moves closer to zero, foreign FDI goes up.  Thus, for skill differences below zero, 
there is a positive relationship between the skill difference and horizontal FDI.  As a result, horizontal FDI is 
greatest when countries are similar in relative skill endowments.  This relationship is shown in Figure 1.  
Finally please note that there are also effects from the relative size of the two countries on FDI.  However, 
since Markusen and Maskus (1999) point to the skill difference as the best method of differentiating among 
the models, I focus on this variable. 
2.2 The Vertical Model 
 The vertical model finds its genesis in Helpman (1984).  In its original form, the model is 
described by a standard Hecksher-Ohlin model with the exception that the factors used in the production of 
the MNE’s good can be combined across borders.  This again represents that the skilled labor used in the 
headquartering activity can be geographically separated from the production activity.  Here, there are no 
trade costs.  As is typical in the Hecksher-Ohlin model, when the factor endowments of the two countries lie 
within the factor price equalization (FPE) set, the integrated world equilibrium can be achieved through trade 
in goods.  Furthermore, there is no need for a MNE since there is no advantage to this structure relative to a 
national firm structure.  If, however, factor endowments are outside the FPE set, this is not true.  The 
integrated world equilibrium can be restored in one of two ways.  First, trade in factors can be permitted, 
implying that factors will relocate until the relative endowments are in the FPE set.  Alternatively, we can 
allow for trade in headquarter services, that is, a trade in the service of the factor rather than the actual 
relocation of the factor.  Since this implies production in one location with its headquarters in another, this is 
the creation of vertical FDI.  In this equilibrium, the skill abundant country specializes in headquartering 
activity while the skill deficient country specializes in the production of both goods.  This yields three 
anticipated patterns of vertical FDI.  First, vertical FDI only exists when factor endowments lie outside of the 
FPE set, i.e. only when the skill difference between the parent and host countries is sufficiently greater than 
 6
zero.  Naturally, in many cases the FPE set can be empty (for details see Bhagwati, Panagariya, and 
Srinivasan, 1998).  Second, only the skill abundant country can be a parent country for vertical FDI.  Third, 
as endowments move further from the FPE set, trade in headquartering services increases, implying that 
vertical FDI is increasing in the skill difference between the parent and the host.  This is shown in Figure 2, 
where the initial point V will be at zero if the FPE set is empty. 
2.3 The Knowledge Capital Model 
 The beauty of the knowledge capital model is that it combines both the horizontal motive for 
investment (minimizing trade and headquartering costs) with the vertical motive (exploiting factor price 
differences).  Unfortunately, this comes at the cost of extreme complexity.  As a result, most of the work on 
the KK model derives its insights from the output of simulations.  As shown in the figures of MVKZ (1996) 
and Markusen (1997), horizontal FDI is most active when countries are similar in relative factor endowments 
while vertical FDI is most prominent when relative endowments differ.  In particular, looking at panel three 
of MVKZ’s Figure 1 where trade costs are reasonably large, no vertical MNEs are present when the 
countries have similar relative endowments and sizes.  As we move from the center of the box towards its 
North-West or South-East corners, that is, as we hold relative size the same but increase the skill difference, 
we move from a region in which all MNEs are horizontal to one in which all MNEs are vertical with a mixed 
region in between.  Thus, as we move from a skill difference of zero towards positive infinity, this indicates 
that we would expect to move from a region wherein all FDI from the skill abundant country is horizontal to 
one in which both horizontal and vertical FDI coexist to one in which only vertical FDI occurs.  For the skill 
deficient country, which only has outbound horizontal FDI, movement away from equal relative endowments 
decreases its outbound FDI as before. 
 What does this then imply about the relationship between total FDI, that is horizontal and 
vertical FDI combined, and skill differences?  This is the same as asking what can happen when I combine 
my Figures 1 and 2 into a Figure 3.  Since near a zero skill difference horizontal FDI describes the majority 
of investment, we find a negative relationship between the absolute value of the skill difference and total FDI 
(although naturally the slope need not be the same on either side).  As we move further into the positive skill 
differences, vertical FDI begins to pick up.  Eventually, vertical FDI dominates the investment and we find a 
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positive relationship between the skill difference and total FDI.  This implies that the KK model predicts a 
very non-monotonic relationship between skill differences and FDI.  Specifically, as we move from a 
negative skill difference towards a large positive skill difference, we expect FDI to increase, then decrease, 
then increase again. 
 This is not, however, what CMM (2001) suggest.  In their graphs, they illustrate a positive 
monotonic relationship between the skill difference and FDI for both skill deficient and skill abundant 
parents, that is, they predict a relationship that is upward sloping across all skill differences as illustrated by 
the dashed line in Figure 3.  Because of this, they predict that the estimated coefficient for the skill difference 
should be positive, regardless of whether the parent country is skill abundant or not.  For this to be true it is 
necessary that any reductions in horizontal investment be more than compensated by increases in vertical 
investment.  This places two requirements on the figures.  First, V, the point at which vertical FDI initially 
appears, must be equal to zero.  This in turn implies that for extremely small endowment differences, some 
firms find the vertical structure superior to the national structure.  For this to be true the FPE set must be 
empty for all differing relative factor endowments and that headquartering costs be the same for vertical and 
national firms.  While there exist plenty of situations in which we expect FPE to fail, including the non-
competitive MNE sector of MVKZ (1996), it is not clear what stance those authors take on the relative 
headquartering costs between national and vertical firms.  On page 6, in Assumption (a) they indicate that 
vertical and national firms have the same fixed costs (which represent the headquartering costs).  However, 
on the following page, they state that the vertical firm’s fixed costs are one percent higher than the national 
firm’s fixed cost.  In any case, if V is equal to zero, one can argue that this violates the spirit of Helpman’s 
original version in which vertical FDI only occurred if the skill difference is relatively large.  Second, the 
change in vertical investment must be larger than the opposite of the change in horizontal investment for all 
skill differences greater than V.  This requires that the slope of the line in Figure 2 must be greater than the 
opposite of the slope of the relationship in Figure 1 everywhere to the right of V.  Alternatively, it is possible 
that the graphs presented in CMM (2001) do in fact have a dip similar to that in Figure 3 but, given the 
parameters they chose, it is just too small to see.  In any case, a more general interpretation of the KK model 
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includes those that exhibit a far more non-monotonic relationship between skill differences and FDI than 
CMM indicate. 
2.4 Empirical Evidence 
 As discussed above, several studies have used variants of the KK model to create an empirical 
framework for studying FDI.  Of these, CMM (2001) is perhaps the best known and rightly so because it 
offers the first theory-driven empirical specification for FDI.  As discussed above, to estimate the 
relationship between endowments and FDI, the authors use the skill difference between the parent and the 
host.  In addition because their simulations show that this relationship is impacted by country size differences 
and trade costs, they interact the skill difference with other variables.  They find that, as they hypothesized, 
the coefficient on skill difference is positive and significant.  Note that this does not imply that the total 
marginal effect of skill difference on FDI is positive because of the interaction terms.  In fact, they estimate a 
negative total marginal effect of skill differences on FDI even though the direct effect is positive and 
significant.  Markusen and Maskus (2001) use a comparable specification but restrict attention to only U.S. 
outbound FDI.  In contrast to the prediction of CMM, they find both negative direct and marginal effects 
from skill differences.   The authors attribute this to the extreme size of the U.S. which restricts their 
observations to one corner of the simulated diagrams.  BDH (2002) explores this idea further and instead link 
this negative relationship between FDI and skill differences to the fact that the U.S. is almost always the skill 
abundant country.  Because of this, the outbound data used by Markusen and Maskus (2001) is always to the 
right of zero skill differences.  Furthermore, BDH claim that the CMM empirical specification is not general 
enough to test the KK model because it does not allow for different slopes on either side of zero as called for 
by the horizontal model.  When they allow for different marginal effects of skill differences on either side of 
zero, they find a pattern similar to Figure 1 and state that the horizontal model cannot be rejected in favor of 
the KK model.  They find this result in the data used by CMM (2001), Markusen and Maskus (2001), an 
expanded U.S. data set, and an OECD data set covers a broader range of the simulated figures.  Markusen 
and Maskus (1999), who use the CMM (2001) data and dummy variable interactions to allow for different 
coefficients on either side of zero, also suggest that the horizontal model cannot be rejected in favor of the 
KK model.  
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 However, just as BDH suggests that the CMM specification is too restrictive to adequately 
test the KK model, the BDH or Markusen and Maskus (1999) specifications are too restrictive as well 
because they do not allow for non-monotonicities in skill differences when the parent is skill abundant.  In 
other words, just as a straight line is not sufficient to estimate the relationship in Figure 1, straight lines on 
either side of zero are not sufficient to estimate the relationship in Figure 3.  Therefore, I estimate a more 
general version of the empirical specification suggested by CMM (2001) using both the U.S. data of CMM 
and the expanded U.S. and OECD data of BDH (2002).  When I do so, I find evidence that does allow me to 
reject the horizontal model in favor of the KK model.3 
 
3. Data and Empirical Specification 
 Before describing the data, let me discuss the basic CMM specification: 
 
FDIij =  f (SUMGDPij, GDPDIFSQij, SKDIFFij, SKDIFFij* GDPDIFFij, (SKDIFFij)2*T_COSTj,       
 DISTANCEij, T_COSTi, T_COSTj, F_COSTj) 
             
The dependent variable, FDIij is a measure of FDI activity from a parent country (i) to a host country (j).   
The first two independent variables are SUMGDP defined as the sum of the two countries’ real gross 
domestic products (GDPs) and GDPDIFSQ defined as the squared difference between the two countries’ real 
GDP.  These are intended to capture country size effects, with an expected positive correlation between 
SUMGDP and FDIij and an expected negative correlation between GDPDIFSQ and FDIij.  The third term is 
my variable of interest, the skill difference between the parent and the host.  The next two terms interact this 
with GDP differences and trade costs.  This is intended to capture some of the observations CMM make 
when varying these parameters in their simulations.  Distance (DISTANCEij) is included to proxy for 
transport and other trade costs.  T_COSTi and T_COSTj  represent additional barriers to trade for the parent 
and the host respectively.  Finally, F_COSTj proxies for the barriers to setting up an MNE in the host.  I 
                                                 
3 An alternative explanation for the lack of vertical FDI evidence is that the proxies for relative skill endowments are 
poor.  Braconier, Norb@ck, and Urban (2002) use wage differences instead of the job categories of CMM or the 
education of BDH.  They find that this measure tends to be more significant than the others and is indicative of greater 
vertical FDI.  They do not, however, use the higher order specification I suggest and therefore are unable to adequately 
test the KK model. 
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modify this basic specification by introducing SKDIFF2ij and SKDIFF3ij which are the squares and cubes of 
the “plain” skill difference between the parent and host countries. 
 I use the same data as CMM (2001) and BDH (2002).  This provides me with three sets of 
data, two for FDI with the U.S. and one for FDI with the OECD.  While I refer the interested reader to those 
papers for details on the data, I must point out some important differences between these three data sets.  
CMM use bilateral FDI data with the U.S. over the period 1986-1994.  For their measure of a country’s 
relative skill endowment, they use the percentage of workers employed in either the 0/1 (professional, 
technical, and kindred workers) or 2 (administrative workers) job categories as reported by the International 
Labor Organization.  For their U.S. data, BDH use U.S. inbound FDI from 1984 to 1992 and U.S. outbound 
FDI from 1983 to 1992.  Their sample covers a broader collection of partner countries because they use 
different skill, trade, and investment proxies.  In particular, this data set uses a country’s mean years of 
education as reported by Barro and Lee (1996) as a proxy for skill.  Both of these data sets measure FDI 
activity as the sales by foreign affiliates.  These data are provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  The 
OECD data set is an unbalanced panel from 1982 to 1992.  This set also uses the mean years of education as 
the skill proxy.  Unlike the other two data sets, it uses the stock of foreign direct investment as the measure 




 Tables 1, 2, and 3 present OLS results using CMM’s U.S. data, BDH’s expanded U.S. data, 
and BDH’s OECD data respectively.  The first column of each table replicates their OLS results.4  In all 
three data sets, the estimated coefficient on the plain skill difference is positive as anticipated by CMM.  The 
second column introduces the squared skill difference to the standard specification.  For the CMM and the 
OECD data, I find that both the plan skill difference’s coefficient is again significantly positive while the 
squared skill difference coefficient is significantly negative.  In the BDH expanded U.S. data, the squared 
                                                 
4 In unreported results, I also used their Tobit and Weighted Least Squares procedures and found qualitatively similar 
results.  These additional estimates are available upon request. 
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term is insignificant.  Roughly, this implies that when the host is skill abundant, FDI is increasing in the skill 
difference while when the parent is skill abundant, FDI is decreasing in the skill difference.  This is 
consistent with Markusen and Maskus (1999) and BDH (2002). 
If I were to stop at this point as Markusen and Maskus (1999) or BDH (2002) did, I would be 
unable reject the horizontal model in favor of the KK model.  However, as discussed above, introducing this 
squared term is not enough to give the vertical FDI a chance to reveal itself in the KK model.  Thus, the third 
column of the three tables includes both a squared and a cubed skill difference in the CMM specification.  If 
the description of the KK model in Figure 3 is correct, we might expect the plain and cubed skill difference 
to have positive coefficients while the squared skill difference has a negative coefficient.  Unfortunately, the 
data does not exhibit strong evidence for this.  I only find the expected pattern of signs in the OECD data, 
where the plain skill difference coefficient is insignificant.  In the CMM data, although the plain and squared 
skill differences perform as expected, the cubed term is insignificant and has the wrong sign.  Finally, in the 
BDH U.S. data, while all three skill differences are significant, only the plain skill difference has the 
anticipated sign.  Furthermore, I find that introducing the squared or cubed terms does little in terms of 
improving my R2s.  This is admittedly somewhat disappointing for my story since it indicates that even with 
my expanded specification, there is little evidence for vertical FDI. 
As an alternative to this cubed specification, I estimated the expanded CMM specification 
after separating my observations into those with positive skill differences and those with negative skill 
differences.  I refer to these subsamples as the positive and negative subsets.  Since the negative subset 
should include only horizontal FDI while the positive subset includes both horizontal and vertical FDI, I 
anticipate that this split will allow the estimation procedure to better capture the vertical forces at work.  
Note that for the CMM and the BDH U.S. data, this implies that I am more or less splitting my observations 
into U.S. outbound (positive skill differences) and U.S. inbound (negative skill differences) data sets.  If the 
KK model described by Figure 3 is a reasonable description of the data, I expect that for the direct marginal 
effect of a rise in skill differences should be positive for the negative subset.  For the positive subset, I expect 
that the direct marginal effect of skill differences will switch from negative to positive as the skill difference 
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rises.  Therefore, for the positive subset, I expect that the plain skill difference will be negative while the 
squared skill difference will be positive. 
The fourth column of Tables 1 through 3 presents OLS estimates when using the negative 
skill difference observations.  In the CMM and BDH U.S. data, the significant coefficients imply that FDI is 
strictly increasing in the skill difference.  The OECD data finds that FDI is increasing for skill differences 
below 1.5, that is when average years of education in the parent is 1.5 years less than in the host.  In this 
subsample, this implies that for the majority of observations, FDI is increasing in the skill difference.5  
Combining this information indicates that in the negative subset, FDI does seem to be increasing in the skill 
difference.  In other words, as the skill difference rises towards zero, implying a movement towards equal 
relative skill endowments, FDI rises as the horizontal and KK models predict.  Furthermore, for the BDH 
expanded U.S. sample and the OECD data, restricting attention to the negative subset dramatically improves 
the models fit of the data. 
This does not, however, imply that we can differentiate between the horizontal and KK 
models since to the left of zero skill differences these two models are the same.  To deal with this question, it 
is necessary to consider the positive subset where vertical FDI can occur in the KK model but not in the 
horizontal model.  Therefore, in the final column of Tables 1 through 3, I present OLS estimates when using 
the positive skill difference subset.  In each case, as expected, I find that the plain skill difference has a 
negative coefficient while the squared skill difference has a positive coefficient.6  For the BDH U.S. and the 
OECD data, both of these coefficients are also significant, while in the CMM data, only the plain skill 
difference is significant.  Since the BDH U.S. data’s alternate trade and investment cost measures permit the 
inclusion of more developing countries (those we would expect to receive vertical FDI), this difference in 
                                                 
5 The mean skill difference in this subsample is –1.64 while the standard deviation is 1.22.   
 
6 One interesting implication of the estimated upturn in FDI for large skill differences is that it may help to explain why 
the existing literature continually finds a positive coefficient for skill differences when using all observations and only 
the plain skill difference.  If the data corresponded to Figure 1, one might expect that a negative estimated coefficient is 
as likely as a positive one.  However, if the data looks more like Figure 3, this second upward-sloping section might tip 
the scales in favor of finding a positive coefficient. 
 13
significance levels is not surprising.7  Furthermore, for the BDH U.S. data and the OECD data, restricting the 
data to skill abundant parents greatly improves the fit of the model.  These coefficients are those predicted by 
the KK model but still do not imply I can reject the horizontal model in favor of the KK model, since it is 
unclear whether FDI is simply asymptoting towards zero or whether it actually swings back up as in Figure 
3.  In other words, do these estimates imply a simple tapering off of horizontal FDI or do they actually 
suggest a rise in vertical investment? 
To get at this issue, I calculated the estimated inflection points from these three regressions.  
For the CMM data, the inflection point is .501, that is FDI only starts to rise again when the percentage of 
workers employed in skilled jobs in the parent is 50 percent points higher than in the host.  Since the 
maximum difference in this subsample is only 27.7 percentage points, there are in fact no country pairs in the 
CMM database that actually exhibit the positive slope that characterizes vertically dominated FDI.  In the 
BDH U.S. data, I find a similar result since the inflection point is at an eighteen year difference in mean 
years of education whereas the maximum value for this difference is only 9.5 years.  Thus, on the basis of 
these two data sets, I am still unable to reject the horizontal model in favor of the vertical model.  The OECD 
data, however, tells a different story.  Here, the estimated inflection point is a difference in mean education 
of 3.9 years compared to an average and maximum difference of 2.88 and 8.1.  Thus, while the average 
country pair in the OECD sample is dominated by horizontal FDI, there are country pairs that are dominated 
by vertical investment.  Thus, for the OECD sample, I can reject the horizontal model in favor of the KK 
model. 
What is driving this difference between the OECD estimates and those for the U.S.?  One 
culprit is that the two U.S. data sets are almost entirely comprised of U.S. outbound investment.  Since the 
U.S. is so much larger than other countries, it is possible that these estimates cover only a limited section of 
the parameter space analyzed by the KK theories.  In particular, looking at the figures of MVKZ (1996) or 
Markusen (1997), when one country is much larger than the other, we might expect little FDI to occur 
regardless of the relative skill endowments.  Alternatively, this difference could be driven by the differing 
                                                 
7 Regardless of the data set used, the other control variables have roughly the same signs and significance levels for the 
positive and negative skill difference subsamples. 
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measures of FDI activity since the OECD data sets uses the stock of FDI while the other two data sets use the 
sales of foreign affiliates.  To test this possibility, I repeat the inflection point exercise using the positive 
subsample of the BDH expanded U.S. data but using the stock of FDI instead of affiliate sales.  These 
estimates are found in Table 4.  As with the sales measure, the plain skill difference has a negative, 
significant coefficient while the squared skill difference has a positive, significant coefficient.  Unlike the 
sales data, however, the estimated inflection point is at a difference of 3.38 years, which is below the average 
difference of 4.7 years.  This indicates that country pairs dominated by vertical FDI can be isolated when 
using the U.S. stock data but not the U.S. sales data.  Since the stock data is more complete than the sales 
data, the final two columns of Table 4 re-estimate the equation using only those observations for which both 
stock and sales information was available.  Using the stock results from column two, the estimated inflection 
point is at a 4.7 year difference.  The sales data, however, estimates the inflection point to be at a difference 
of 16.4 years.  This indicates that the KK empirical specification finds evidence of vertical FDI when the 
measure of FDI activity is the stock of investment but not when it is the sales by overseas affiliates. 
What might cause this difference between the sales and stock measures?  One possibility is 
that the stock captures the accumulated changes in investment up to the current period while sales reflect the 
current output of those decisions.  If there are short-run fluctuations that impact a MNE’s choices in a given 
year but not its long-run strategy, then we might expect the stock to better reflect long-run trends such as 
long-term factor price differences.  Alternatively, the answer may lie with the incentives a MNE has to 
manipulate its international finances.  In particular, if one of the primary purposes of vertical FDI is to export 
back to the parent, an MNE might have an incentive to distort its sales figures in order to engage in transfer 
pricing and avoid taxation or other costs.  Since this might not affect a firm’s stock decision but only the 
income it reports to the government, this could create the difference I observe.  While these possibilities are 
intriguing, they lie outside the scope of this paper and I leave them to future research. 
Finally, Table 5 presents a list of the countries with skill differences above the inflection 
points calculated from the stock regressions.  Not surprisingly, the host countries are primarily developing 
countries while the parents are the large, developed countries (recall that the U.S. is always the parent 
country in the BDH U.S. data).  Two hosts are rather unexpected: Australia and Switzerland.  While these 
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countries certainly seem skilled anecdotally, the BDH data lists both of them as having fewer than seven 
average years of schooling.  Since this is quite probably a data error, I have repeated the regressions omitting 
these two nations.  This had little impact on my results and I was still able to reject the horizontal model in 
favor of the KK model when using FDI stocks. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 The purpose of this paper has been to shed some light on the empirical debate between the 
horizontal and knowledge capital models.  By returning to the original theories, I have found that the 
specifications used in this debate may not be sufficient to adequately compare the two models.  In particular, 
while the horizontal model may be adequately described by a linear relationship between FDI and skill 
differences on either side of zero, the KK model requires a richer empirical specification.  By using an 
alternative framework, I am able to isolate country pairs for which FDI seems to be dominated by vertical 
investment as opposed to horizontal investment.  Unlike previous work, this result permits me to reject the 
horizontal model of FDI in favor of the more comprehensive KK model when measuring FDI activity by the 
stock of FDI.  While there are still several unanswered questions surrounding these models, in particular why 
vertical FDI is found in FDI stocks but not in affiliate sales, I hope that these results serve as a resolution for 
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Table 1: Regressions Using CMM Data 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Affiliate Sales of Country i’s firms located in Country j 
Skill Differences 
 Included: 







































SKDIFF3ij   -393,477.780 
(0.96) 
  






































































      
Observations 509 509 509 203 306 
R-squared 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.55 
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 





















Table 2: Regressions Using BDH U.S. Data 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Affiliate Sales of Country i’s firms located in Country j 
Skill Differences 
 Included: 







































SKDIFF3ij   -30.405*** 
(3.83) 
  






































































      
Observations 778 778 778 397 381 
R-squared 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.83 0.63 
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 





















Table 3: Regressions Using BDH OECD Data 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Stock of Country i’s FDI in Country j 
Skill Differences 
 Included: 







































SKDIFF3ij   26.523*** 
(3.39) 
  






































































      
Observations 2460 2460 2460 671 1789 
R-squared 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.62 0.32 
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 






















Table 4: Regressions Using Positive Skill Difference BDH Data 
 



































































    
Observations 493 372 372 
R-squared 0.39 0.40 0.63 
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 























Table 5: Parents and Hosts of Vertical FDI 
 
 
Hosts (BDH U.S. Data): 
Australia Brazil Chile China Columbia Ecuador Egypt India Indonesia 
Iran Israel Korea Malaysia Mexico Morocco Nigeria Pakistan Peru 
Philippines Singapore Spain Switzerland Thailand Turkey Venezuela   
 
Hosts (OECD Data): 
Australia Brazil Chile China Columbia Egypt India Indonesia Israel 
Italy Korea Malaysia Mexico Morocco Nigeria Philippines Portugal Singapore 
Spain Switzerland Thailand Turkey      
 
Parents (OECD Data): 
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